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Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to look briefly at theories in general, before concentrating 
on scientific theories - how they are used, structured, tested and verified. The research 
that uses the kind of scientific theories we are concentrating on is often referred to as 
quantitative research but for the sake of completeness, we will also discuss theories in 
so called qualitative research. 
   
Theories are an absolutely essential part of our daily life. They help us to make sense 
of the enormous mass of information and perceptions we are bombarded with every 
day. Theories help us to recognise, identify and classify things and events, to 
understand, explain, relate and to make predictions. They give us context and 
hierarchy. In short, theories combine to make up our understanding of the world. We 
have theories for all purposes, theories that say that “if you heat up a metal rod, it will 
expand” or “the time required to make a decision is in inverse proportion to the 
money involved” or “the earth is flat” or that “if you sin, God will punish you”.  
 
The philosophy behind theories 
With so many different roles for theories, there is a corresponding array of different 
types of theories, based on different philosophies and different uses of the theories.  
The same applies to scientific theories. There is no single definition of “Scientific 
Theories” beyond the general proposition that they are derived through scientific 
methods, but there are many methods based on many different, sometimes conflicting 
philosophies and methodologies of science.  What we will do here is to discuss the 
characteristics and uses of scientific theories to illustrate what we think are desirable 
or undesirable aspects of theories. For the purpose of this chapter, there are in 
particular, two different issues that we will look at to distinguish between different 
types of theories.  
 
The first issue is our ontology, our philosophy with respect to the nature of reality. To 
some, reality is governed by a set of rules of how variables inter-relate and science 
aims to uncover these rules so that we can understand and describe, through our 
theories, an objective reality that exists independent of us. To others, reality is 
subjective, a social construct, changing depending on who views it and existing only 
in our minds as our constructs (Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 1995)1. 
 
The second, related issue is our epistemology, our philosophy about the nature of 
knowledge. To some, knowledge is objective, independent of the “knower” and his or 
her perspective, attachments and values. To others, knowledge is subjective, formed 
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 These positions are obviously extremes and there are intermediate positions. For instance, many, 
who believe in an objective reality as far as the natural sciences are concerned, believe that people 
can not, for various reasons, be the subject of the same kind of rules. Others make exceptions for 
areas like personal faith, where a God can over-ride any natural laws.  
by the “knower(s)”, reflecting his, her or their viewpoints, attachments and values. 
(Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 1995), 
 
Obviously, there is a substantial gap between an objective knowledge about an 
objective reality on one hand, and a subjective knowledge about a subjective reality 
on the other. As we will see, scientific theories that we use for research into 
construction management, are based on an ontology assuming an orderly reality that 
can be uncovered and known through research and an epistemology of objective 
knowledge that exists independently of the “knower. The kinds of theories, which 
specify the rules for how variables interact, are often referred to as positivist or post-
positivist, or in the recent debate as “quantitative” research. It utilises information that 
can be observed and measured and is used to test theories. The latter, which we will 
not discuss here, is qualitative research. This term covers a multitude of approaches 
that have in common only that they reject quantitative research2. In their extreme 
forms, they adopt an ontology and epistemology that sees reality as a social construct 
and knowledge as individual and context dependent. This means that there can be no 
theories as there are no rules about reality to uncover and there can be no 
generalisations because knowledge exists only in the mind of the “knower” (Guba and 
Lincoln, 1994, Meyer, 1999, Crauss, 2005, Crotto, 1998,. Plack, 2005), in fact there 
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 There is a wide range of opinions about what constitutes Qualitative Research, ranging from the use 
of non-quantitative data to the extreme forms of constructivism and critical theory and including 
grounded theory. The common factors is that the research is not aimed at testing or constructing 
theories – many of the approaches do not accept the existence of theories in social sciences. Rather, 
in a very value-loaded terminology used by the proponents of qualitative research, their aim is to 
understand, to see the world as their subjects see it. Grounded theory, which accepts the existence of 
theories, but for some reason is normally classified as qualitative, is not a theory about research, but 
rather a strategy to refer to the results of an empirical research project  - a set of inductive research 
propositions – as a theory, without going through any of the rigmarole of testing and verification that 
is normally associated with the formation of new theories. For the reader interested in readings 
promoting qualitative research, the references cited in this paragraph are a good start.  
 
can be no science because theories, forecasting and generalised explanations are the 
essence of science. 
 
Whatever philosophy we have of science, it is not a given but drawn from concepts 
that has evolved over the last three thousand years or so, since we started thinking 
about science, and it continues to evolve (Runeson and Skitmore, 1999).  
 
Scientific theories 
Before we go any further, we need a definition of this kind of scientific “theory”. In 
its simplest forms, it consists of a set of assumptions or statements, from which it is 
possible to logically deduct theorems. These theorems will convert a set of 
observations into explanations or predictions that can then be compared to real events. 
In economics, for instance, we have a theory based on a set of assumptions including 
that sellers want to maximise their profit, that buyers want to maximise their utility, 
that the addition of an input - like labour - into production increases output but at a 
diminishing rate if there is no change to the input of other factors and that increasing 
the consumption of a good increases the wellbeing of the consumer, but at a 
diminishing rate. From this theory, we can logically deduce that as the price of a good 
falls, the consumption will increase. This prediction can then be tested against reality 
and we can get an idea of the usefulness of our theory (Runeson and Skitmore, 1999). 
 
In addition to the theory, we normally have a set of auxiliary statements, statements 
that sets the environment or the circumstances of our observations. In the example 
above, the number of sellers and buyer that interact in the market is important for the 
exact outcome of a change in parameters. With one buyer and one seller, the outcome 
of a disruption in a market will be quite different to what it would be in a market with 
many buyers and sellers, so we need auxiliary statements about the nature of the 
market (Melitz, 1965). 
 
This kind of theory is referred to as “hypothetico-deductive’ theory: we can deduce 
our theorems from a set of assumptions (statements; hypotheses, axioms) that are 
supposed to have universal validity. The theorems do not create any new knowledge, 
because all knowledge was already implied in the original theory, all the theorems do 
is to present this knowledge in a more specific form.  
 
The alternative is the inductive theory. After watching a great number of white swans, 
we feel entitled to induce that all swans are white. This is not logically derived, 
because only when we have seen all swans in the past, present and future can we 
logically justify this conclusion. On the other hand, by stating that all swans are white, 
we create new knowledge, although in this case, it happens to be less than 100 per 
cent correct. In practice, it is difficult to see examples where either of these strict rules 
of reasoning has been applied in isolation in the formulation of theories. Normally we 
have an interaction between deduction and induction. 
 
The final requirement, which we will discuss in detail later, is that the theory should 
be testable, at least in principle. This means that our theories should be positive 
theories where a disagreement can be resolved by reference to facts. The alternative is 
metaphysical theories, which includes normative theories, theories about what things 
ought to be. For obvious reasons, there are some theories that we will rarely or never 
be able to test, such as our various theories about the origin of the universe. This is 
why we say “in principle”. Should a new universe be created, it is possible that we 
could do the measurements that would test the theories.  
 
Working as a scientist 
Now we have a theory, and the next question is: “what do we do with it”? If you are a 
higher degree research student3, whether in the built environment or some other area, 
you are required to initiate, plan, execute and report on a project where you can 
demonstrate that you can work as a scientist. This means taking a theory and use it 
as a scientist would. This pushes the question back one step, to: what do scientists do? 
Essentially they do three things: develop theories, test theories and use theories to 
solve problems. According to Popper (1959, 1972, 1982, 1983b), the most important 
philosopher of science in the twentieth century, the proper job of a scientist is to test 
theories, and higher degree assessors and academic research fund administrators 
agree. Using theories or developing technology, while sometimes highly skilled, is not 
science as such and will not result in higher degrees or research funds. Scientist may 
do it, but not when they are acting as scientist in the sense Popper uses the word. The 
reasoning that Popper used to derive his idea of the proper job for scientists was based 
on the dichotomy between verification and falsification and the possibility that any 
number of theories may produce theorems that are similar.  
 
The dichotomy is easy to demonstrate. Any number of observations of white swans 
doesn’t prove that the statement “all swans are white” is true. However, one single 
observation of a black swan is proof that it is false. The possibility that there are many 
theories that may produce similar theorems is a little bit more difficult to demonstrate, 
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 This may not be true for professional doctorates, where solving professional problems may be 
acceptable.  
but the concept of an electrone is one recent example. Not all that long ago, the atom 
had a nucleus, orbited by a number of electrons. The electrons were like mini-planets 
orbiting a mini-sun.  In contrast, now, while the electrons are still orbiting around the 
nucleus, they do not have fixed orbits. Instead, they move from one orbit to another 
but without passing the space between, dematerialising in one place and materialising 
in another as the atom releases and absorbs energy, Sometimes the electrons behave 
like bullets, at other times they are waves, being both substance and non-substance. 
When they are waves, they move in a medium that doesn’t conceivable exist, not even 
a vacuum as the electrons occupy a multidimensional space. 
 
The reason for these changes in the theory is that testing has demonstrated the need 
for modifications. Both theories can still answer all the old questions, but new 
developments demand that the theory can answer new questions. To Popper such 
modifications do not prove that the new theory is right, they don’t even reduce the 
number of potential alternative theories, but many have taken issue with him on that 
point. They point out, that our confidence in a theory increases if attempts to falsify it 
have been unsuccessful. The theory may not be demonstrated, logically, beyond doubt 
to be true, but it is the best theory around and the evidence is that it is the one that the 
scientists use. As Putnam (1974, 1978), for instance, has pointed out: science would 
be rather meaningless unless it does help us to select the best theory. 
 
While we can’t know if a theory is true, we know that a new version is better than the 
previous if it can answer the same questions as the earlier theory plus some additional 
questions. In this way we can see science evolve over time. As we saw with the theory 
of the atom, the change may be substantial over time, but essentially, it is incremental 
changes aggregated over time.  
 
The plot gets complex 
So far, it has been reasonably simple: one concept of science, one philosophy, a 
standard set of rules. We shall now introduce a few complications. When we are 
talking about theories in the natural sciences, we are talking about physical entities, 
electrons, molecules, electric charges and the like which react with other variables in 
an exact cause effect pattern. The cause and effect are direct. The electrons do not 
stop to think about what to do, or how much, before they do it. However, people do 
just that (Rosenberg, 1994).  
 
Construction management is mostly about people, interacting with other people. This 
spans several of the so called social sciences, like psychology, economics and 
sociology. In most of the social sciences, the theory is based on an assumption about a 
motivation. In economics it is about maximising profit or wellbeing. The producer 
that wants to maximise profit must think before he or she changes the level of 
production when the market changes and so must the buyer that wants to maximise 
his or her wellbeing. They must interpret each situation and make up their minds 
about what behaviour will be most beneficial.  
 
In these cases, we can not have falsification in the way Popper stipulated4 (1959; 
1972; 1983a), and for a long time we were not certain whether the social sciences 
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 According to Popper’s demarcation criterion – that a statement belongs to the empirical sciences 
only if it is falsifiable (Popper, 1959, originally published in German in 1934) - many of the social 
sciences, should not be considered sciences 
were sciences , and if they were, how we could modify Popper’s criterion: if it can’t 
be falsified, it isn’t science (Hausman, 1985, 1989, Klant 1984, de Marchi 1988 or 
Redman 1991). Popper was to take almost 50 years before he rejoined the debate he 
had started on this issue.  
 
In the meantime Lakatos, one of Popper’s former students, published his work, where 
he accepted theories with an unfalsifiable, metaphysical core, protected and isolated 
from falsification by a protective belt of derivative theories. Lakatos (1970, 1971, 
1977) referred to such a body of theoretical work as a research program and preferred 
corroboration rather than falsification (see Backhause, 1994b).  
 
Rather than falsification, Lakatos looked at the (scientific) usefulness of a research 
program. A theory is a progressive, i.e. useful, theory if it generates scientific progress 
and regressive if there is no such progress. Since many of the social sciences attempt 
to explain a wide range of phenomena on the basis of a small number of behavioural 
assumptions, this evaluation of theories is much more relevant to the actual practice in 
most of these sciences5 (Hands, 1993a).  
 
While progressive and degenerative theories can only be recognised in hindsight the 
concepts provides a useful way of thinking of theories. Even if degeneration does not 
necessarily suggest anomalies of the kind required for falsification, and is not 
necessarily irreversible, a reversal would normally require substantial changes to the 
theoretical framework (Riggs, 1992. 
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 In both areas where Lakatos differ from Popper in respect of social science research, i. e. the 
metaphysical core and the evaluation of theories is he closer to, and has therefore been more 
influential than Popper, although Popper has retained his status in the natural sciences. 
Finally, in after nearly 50 years, Popper modified his criterion for the social sciences: 
... as long as a metaphysical theory can be rationally criticised, I 
should be inclined to take seriously its implicit claim to be considered, 
tentatively, as true. (1982: 199) and … Any critical discussion of it 
will consist, in the main, in considering how well it solves its 
problems; how much better it does so than various competing theories; 
whether it does not create greater difficulties than those which it sets 
out to dispel; whether the solution is simple; how fruitful it is in it is in 
suggesting new problems and solutions; and whether we cannot, 
perhaps, refute it by empirical tests. (1982: 200). Furthermore, ... the 
so called method of science consists in this kind of criticism. Scientific 
theories are distinguished from myths merely in being criticisable, and 
in being open to modifications in the light of criticism (1983b: 7). 
 
That resolves the issue of whether the social sciences are really sciences. All we need 
to do is to accept that we can have causal relationships that are not deterministic (The 
Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 1995). It does, however, leave us with another 
serious problem. In the natural sciences, the assumptions are improved as we go on 
testing them. In the social sciences, because we use motivational variables that can’t 
be falsified, we can’t improve our motivational assumptions by testing them. As the 
assumptions cannot be improved, neither can the systems of theorems about social 
phenomena (Rosenberg, 1994). Hence, there can be no progress in the way the natural 
sciences progress through empirical testing and attempted falsifications. It does not 
mean that we can’t have progress, it just means that it is that much harder. 
 
Testing social science theories 
If the proper job of the social scientist can’t be attempting falsification, what does the 
social scientist do. Putnam (1974, 1991) has suggested what he calls 3 Schemas. 
 
Schema1   Schema 2   Schema 3 
 
Theory    Theory    Theory 
Auxiliary Statements  ??????????????  Auxiliary Statements 
Prediction   Facts to be explained  ????????????? 
 
Schema 1 is the one suggested by Popper, the attempted falsification of a theory. 
Schema 2 is to establish under what auxiliary assumption a theory can explain an 
observed situation, as for instance in the discovery of penicillin6. Schema 3 is when 
we don’t actually know what the outcome is. Whether it is testing a new vaccine for 
side effects or establishing how fast the universe is expanding, we have to create the 
way in which we see or measure reality. 
  
According to Putnam (1974, 1991), all three Schemas are legitimate work for the 
scientist. All three increase our knowledge and move the sciences forward, in the way 
Popper envisaged. This tells us a couple of things about scientific progress. It is 
evolutionary and it involves a large number of scientists, a scientific community. 
While we know of people like Newton, Einstein or Hawking, few scientists have 
developed a theory entirely on their own. Rather, if they have “seen further than 
others” it is “because [they] stood on the shoulders of giants” as Newton expressed it. 
Every individual makes a contribution in increasing our belief that the theory is true 
whenever they try to falsify a theory without success, define the scope of a theory 
whenever they test it in a new application or contribute to a modification of a theory 
whenever they are successfully falsifying a theory. Now and then, when most of the 
evidence it there, someone provides the missing link and gets his/her name into the 
history books as they integrated this knowledge into a consistent framework. 
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 Penicillin was discovered by “accident” when unexpectedly, a culture of bacteria was found not to 
grow in the presence of some mould.   
 However, others, especially Kuhn (1970, 1977), have pointed out, that while this is 
often an appropriate description of progress of science, we sometimes see a totally 
different development. In the words of Kuhn, we have periods of normal science 
when the current theory is answering all questions. This is sometimes followed by a 
scientific crisis when the theory fails to answer a question that is central to the 
science. In some cases this is resolved by a modification to the theory and we go back 
to a period of normal science again, but sometimes this crisis ends in a scientific 
revolution where everything changes, assumptions, auxiliary variables, definitions 
and focus. Some of these instances are even known as revolutions outside the 
scientific community, as for instances the Copernican or the Darwinian revolutions. In 
the Copernican revolution we vent from a finite earth-centred, to an infinite sun-
centred universe and in the Darwinian revolution from creation without evolution to 
evolution without creation. Sometimes the revolution is very slow and the decision to 
change theory can be difficult. Copernicus’ theory produced less accurate forecasts 
and was more complex than the theory it replaced and it took a hundred years until it 
was widely accepted. Sometimes the decision to accept a new theory has been based 
on totally non-scientific concerns (Koestler, 1964). 
 
The reason why we have such problems selecting between theories is that testing 
theories is not a straightforward matter. There are many reasons why we get an 
inappropriate prediction from a theory and most of them say little about the theory 
itself, although some of them say a lot about the scientist that does the testing. 
 
The processes involved in testing a theory are outlined in figure 1 below. The circles 
in the diagram represent processes that may cause the theory to produce the wrong 
answer, but as we will se, it is easier to blame the researcher than to reject the theory 
when things go wrong (Runeson, 1983). Outright rejections of theories are rare. If the 
logic is not there, obviously the theory fails and should be rejected but that is the only 
case of automatic rejection we have. Exogenous variables, variables that are not 
included in the model but may have an impact on the outcome will give the wrong 
prediction but are in themselves not a cause to reject the theory. The same applies to 
an unrepresentative sample. It may lead to an incorrect prediction even when the 
model is “true”. If the measurements used in the test are not appropriate, any testing 
would be meaningless. 
 
The applicability of the model is important like the correspondence. Both are difficult 
and complex concepts, theoretically, philosophically and practically.  If the model is 
not designed for the context in which it is applied, it will not work, but there is no 
automatic cause to reject the model, and we will discuss this later. The 
correspondence concerns how well the theoretical concepts of the theory are 
translated into operational concepts, which can be observed and measured. While 
theoretical concepts are normally clear, there is seldom an easy conversion into 
observable concepts. This applies not only to things like productivity or safety, but 
also to seemingly simple items like costs or construction delays. 
 We will look first at some of the issues that are important for the applicability of 
models, before coming back to correspondence rules. The first issue we will look at is 
the realism of assumptions. The more realism we have in the assumptions, the easier it 
is to determine if a theory is applicable. Most introductory texts in the social sciences 
start by explaining that reality is too complex to observe and that some abstractions 
are necessary in all theorising, so that we can focus on the essential actors and 
relationships. However, there is no agreement about how much “abstracting” is 
desirable. On one extreme, we have people like Friedman (1953), who see no need for 
any form of realism in the assumptions. He even suggests that assumptions can be 
seen as "as if" statements. Things happen as if the assumptions were true. This means 
that the assumptions, may not be supposed to be true and that a theory does not aim to 
answer "why" something happens, but only “how it may be possible”. On the other 
hand, qualitative researchers demand an absolute minimum of abstraction or 
“reduction” as they call it. As a generalisation, the stronger the view that theories 
should explain reality, rather than, or in addition to predict, the stronger the demand 
for realism in the assumptions. 
 
It can be argued that it is the purpose of the theory that determines what we need to 
observe and therefore the degree of realism we need in the assumptions (Machlup 
1952). Hence, if we need them, we may use mental construct that exists only in the 
mind of the scientist and not in reality. However, when we consider the testing of 
social science theories, which as you remember can’t be falsified, we need a middle 
ground between the instrumentalism of Friedman and the descriptions of qualitative 
researchers. This is a level of realism in the assumptions that allows us to combine 
(indirect) empirical tests of the predictions of a theory with direct tests of the auxiliary 
assumptions Nooteboom (1986) 
 
This seems to be what Popper refers to as “rational criticisism” (1982) as it tests how 
well a theory solves problems, on its own and in comparison with competing theories, 
whether the solution is simple; how fruitful it is in suggesting new problems and 
solutions; and whether it can be refuted by testing. (p 200). More specifically, as he 
later suggested, “... the so called method of science consists in this kind of criticism. 
Scientific theories are criticisable, and open to modifications in the light of criticism” 
(1983b: 7 
 
While it is possible to accept both Machlup's view on the needs of the theory and why 
the "as if" assumptions may be useful in certain circumstances, especially in some 
branches of physics, the middle-ground for the social sciences would appear to be 
close to van Fraassen, when he says that “science aims to give us, in its theories, a 
literally true story of what the world is like, and acceptance of a scientific theory 
involves the belief that it is true”(1980: 8).  
 
We need realistic assumptions, because a theory, by itself, has no implications that we 
can observe, and we can’t accept it in isolation from other statements. The theory "if 
A is true, then B is true" doesn’t tell us anything about the world unless A is true. 
Only when we combine the statements "if A is true then B is true " and "A is true" 
does it tell us that B and all implications of B are true (Melitz, 1965; Putnam, 1974). 
This means that there is a strong logical argument that all assumptions should be true. 
The closer the assumptions are to reality, the better we can identify uniquely the 
domain of the theory where it applies. Without this, a theory can not be tested, as it 
can be argued that any falsification is because the theory has been incorrectly 
applied7.  
 
How variables are measured is crucial for all testing. The hypothetico-deductive 
models that we are discussing here can only be related to reality through 
correspondence rules that translate the concepts in the theory into corresponding 
concepts in reality. Similarly, inductive theories require that the observational 
variables can be transformed into unique theoretical concepts. This correspondence, 
through which a theory relates to the external world, is essential for all uses and all 
testing of a theory. However, the correspondence rules are seldom included in the 
theory, and for all cases where they are not, there is a problem.  
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 Note, however, Friedman’s (1953; 19 - 36) argument that the use of assumptions to specify the 
domain of a theory does not necessarily mean that assumptions can be used to define, uniquely, the 
domain. He illustrate this by suggesting that “...there is no inconsistency in regarding the same firm as 
if it were a perfect competitor for one problem and a monopolist for another”. However, this extreme 
view is not widely shared. 
 
 The problem is best summarised in the so called “Duhem-Quine Thesis”, which states 
that when absolute correspondence rules are not specified in the theory, the empirical 
testing of the theory can never be conclusive (Bechtel, 1988). This is because 
operational variables can not be taken as absolute and un-modifiable parts of the 
theory. They must be seen as tentative and subject to revision as we learn more. When 
a theoretical prediction is threatened by an empirical result based on operational 
definitions of theoretical terms, one way to protect the theory is to immunize it by 
requiring revised operational definitions.  
. 
Some interpretations of the Duhem-Quine thesis are even more radical, and suggests 
that in some circumstances 
in deciding where to modify our theoretical structure in the face of 
negative evidence, we may choose to modify the propositions of logic and 
mathematics as well as those more generally thought of as part of 
empirical science (Bechtel 1988; 43). 
 
Whether we accept the Duhem-Quine theorem or not, the influence of this kind of 
thinking is reflected in the many cases in the social sciences where theories that are 
obsolete and should have been rejected many years ago are still in circulation, ready 
to trap any researcher that is not prepared to spend the necessary time to set up the 
theoretical framework and conceptual model. 
 
A solution (or two) 
We now have two good reasons why we can’t falsify a theory, the motivational 
assumption and the Duhem-Quine theorem, and it is also logically impossible to 
prove a theory. Clearly, we can’t be scientists in the way Popper initially suggested, 
but we can still do a few things to help us develop and promote good theories. We can 
corroborate them by repeatedly testing the theories and finding that they seem to be 
true. As Putnam suggested, we can then induce from this process that the theory is 
likely to be adequate. We may develop new theories on the foundation of the research 
program that Lakatos suggested was the evidence of a progressive research program.  
 
We can compare how closely the model resembles the situation we are investigating.  
This concept of testing has been endorsed by van Fraassen. While we can’t know for 
certain, we may reasonably believe that a model is empirically adequate when all the 
aspects of the theory correspond to the situation where it is applied (van Fraassen, 
1991; 193). By extension, a model is empirically inadequate without this fit. 
 
We may also use adduction. We have the theory “if A is true, then B is true; A is true, 
therefore B is true” where we must demonstrate that A is true (affirming the 
antecedent).  If we change the statement to read “if A is true, then B is true; B is 
true”; it does not follow that A is true. To assume that A is true would be to affirm the 
consequent, and the conclusion that A is true is not a logical necessity. This kind of 
reasoning belongs more to the realm of politics than science. Adduction changes the 
emphasis: “B is unexpectedly observed. If A was true, B would be true. Hence it is 
likely that A is true” (Hoover, 1994; 301, following Peirce). This is clearly not a 
logical deduction, as it is logically invalid, but rather a form of inference. It is also a 
form of empirical testing of a theory as it indicates the extent to which observations fit 
a theory. 
 
Building new theories 
With so many potential problems with testing theories, it would be reasonable to ask 
if we can’t do scientific research without this. The answers are “yes” and “no”. There 
are still areas where there are no theories although, more often than not, a failure to 
find an appropriate theory for a special phenomenon has more to do with sloppy 
research than a lack of theories, so it is nowhere near as common as research 
proposals from new PhD candidates would make us believe. Here, of course it is the 
legitimate work of scientists to formulate new theories rather than test existing ones.  
 
However, the procedure when we aim to develop a new theory is very much the same 
as when we test an existing theory. In a research project, we have a cycle that goes 
from theory to hypothesis to data collection to analysis and back to theory for 
modification or corroboration. If the aim of the research is theory formation we face 
the same cycle but start at data collection and end with a hypothesis offered for testing 
of the theory we have proposed. In other words we don’t escape from the theory as 
such, unless our philosophy makes us believe that there can be no theories as in 
qualitative research. 
 
Conclusions 
As with other scientists, built environment researchers need theories for their work to 
be understood, communicable, and ultimately implemented for the benefit of society.  
This paper has brought together and discussed a number of issues that are important in 
both the formulation and testing of scientific theories. The aim is to provide a broad 
overview over an essential, but quite complex topic, and the emphasis has been to 
demonstrate the connection between theories and our philosophy of the world and our 
knowledge of it. This relationship is particularly important when we are involved in 
the kind of research that leads to higher degrees or academic research grants. We have 
also suggested that the major difference between this type of research and so called 
qualitative research is not in the measurement of the information but in our 
fundamental perception of the world. 
 
While we have demonstrated that the “traditional” idea of falsification can not be 
applied in the social sciences that contribute to construction management, we have 
pointed to alternatives in the form of corroboration, including adduction  
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